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Abstract 
 
Motor vehicles contribute to climate change and petroleum dependence. Improving their fuel 
economy by making them lighter need not compromise safety 
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Introduction 
 
The cars and trucks plying America’s roads and highways generate roughly 20 percent of the 
nation’s total emissions of carbon dioxide, a pollutant that is, of course, of increasing concern 
because of its influence on climate. Motor vehicles also account for most of our country’s 
dependence on imported petroleum, the price of which has recently skyrocketed to near-record 
levels. So policymakers would welcome the many benefits that would accrue from lessening the 
amount of fuel consumed in this way. Yet lawmakers have not significantly tightened new 
vehicle fuel-economy standards since they were first enacted three decades ago. Since then, 
manufacturers have, for the most part, used advances in automotive technology, ones that could 
have diminished fuel consumption, to boost performance and increase vehicle weight. In 
addition, the growth in popularity of pickups, sport utility vehicles (SUVs) and minivans—and 
the large amounts of gas they typically guzzle—has resulted in the average vehicle using the 
same amount of fuel per mile as it did 20 years ago. 
 
One of the historical impediments to imposing tougher fuel-economy standards has been the 
long-standing worry that reducing the mass of a car or truck to help meet these requirements 
would make it more dangerous to its occupants in a crash. People often justify this concern in 
terms of “simple physics,” noting, for example, that, all else being equal, in a head-on collision, 
the lighter vehicle is the more strongly decelerated, an argument that continues to sway 
regulators, legislators and many in the general public.  
 
We have spent the past several years examining the research underlying this position—and some 
recent work challenging it. We have also conducted our own analyses and come to the 
conclusion that the claim that lighter vehicles are inherently dangerous to those riding in them is 
flawed. For starters, all else is never equal; other aspects of vehicle design appear to control what 
really happens in a crash, as reflected in the safety record of different kinds of vehicles. What’s 
more, the use of high-strength steel, light-weight metals such as aluminum and magnesium, and 
fiber-reinforced plastics now offers automotive engineers the means to fashion vehicles that are 
simultaneously safer and less massive than their predecessors, and such designs would, of 
course, enjoy the better fuel economy that shedding pounds brings. 
 
Saving Gas, Saving Lives 
 
If a typical car could somehow drop 10 percent of its mass, its fuel economy would increase by 
anywhere from 3 percent to 8 percent. (The larger value applies if the size of the engine is also 
reduced to keep acceleration performance the same.) Designers are keenly aware of this relation, 
and after federal fuel-economy standards were first enacted, automakers virtually eliminated the 
heaviest cars (those weighing more than 4,000 pounds) from their new-vehicle fleets. These 
behemoths went from 46 percent of sales in 1975 to just 9 percent in 1980, after which only a 
dwindling number could be found in showrooms (Figure 1). But in the late 1980s, the sales of 
heavier “light trucks,” including many of the SUVs used as substitutes for cars, began to 
increase. By 2003, the fraction of light trucks weighing more than 4,000 pounds reached 32 
percent. 
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Figure 1.  To meet fuel-economy standards put in place in during the 1970s, manufacturers reduced the 
number of heavy cars they sold, in particular those weight more than 4,500 pounds (dark blue), which by 1980 
became comparatively rare items in showrooms.  But in later decades, lessened concerns about fuel prices 
and lax fuel-economy standards for light trucks led to burgeoning sales of pickups and SUVs in this weight 
class (red), which in 2006 accounted for almost 40 percent of the new-vehicle fleet.  (source: Heavenrich 2005) 
 
People often feel very secure and protected when driving such mammoth vehicles. And indeed, 
the tendency of such large masses to resist sudden deceleration adds some degree of safety. But 
deceleration is a relatively small danger compared with the three phenomena that most 
frequently kill and maim people in a serious crash: intrusion of another vehicle or roadside object 
into the passenger compartment, rollovers, or failure of the restraints to keep the occupants from 
hitting hard interior surfaces.  
 
The key factors that determine whether a life-threatening intrusion will take place are the 
strength of the passenger compartment and the height and stiffness of the collision partner. 
Automakers could thus use stronger materials and more compatible designs to reduce casualties 
in two-vehicle collisions; adding mass is not necessary. For example, designers could incorporate 
light honeycomb-sandwich panels or fiber-reinforced materials to help sever the connection 
between mass and strength.  
 
The best strategies for avoiding rollover are to lower a vehicle’s center of gravity and to increase 
its track width (the distance between the right and left tires). Electronic stability control, a 
relatively new technology, also helps by providing automatic braking separately at the four 
wheels in such a way as to inhibit rollover. Once such a mishap occurs, the crush resistance of 
the roof normally determines whether seat-belted occupants get hurt. And, of course, whether 
you are belted in will affect whether you end up being ejected during a crash, which would likely 
result in serious or fatal injury.  
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Restraints, both safety belts and air bags, and interior padding provide important protection to 
occupants in rollovers—indeed, they serve this critical function in all types of crashes. Side-
curtain air bags, which reduce head contact with windows, are becoming more common, and 
advanced seat belts, ones with pretensioners and load limiters, are also being incorporated in 
many models. Under research are four-point seat belts, which hold occupants in position in side-
impact crashes better than do today’s three-point, lap-and-shoulder belts.  
 
Electronic stability control, side-curtain airbags and advanced seat belts tend to be included in 
heavier, more-expensive, vehicles. But such cutting-edge safety equipment need not add much 
mass, particularly if attention is paid to this goal. And although lighter vehicles are often at a 
disadvantage in crashes with heavier ones, a general reduction in vehicle weight across all 
vehicle types would not compromise safety, in part because the relative masses of colliding 
vehicles wouldn’t change, but also because a substantial majority of casualties in motor vehicle 
crashes are unrelated to the masses of the vehicles involved.  
 
Just what then does control safety on the road? Driver behavior and environmental factors 
contribute most to whether a serious accident takes place and to the speed of the impact. Whether 
the occupants of the car or truck involved are properly wearing their safety belts influences the 
type and extent of injuries, as do the age and physical condition of these people. But it is vehicle 
design that above all affects the severity of the consequences of a given crash.  
 
Nothing Simple About Safety 
 
Although serious auto wrecks are relatively rare events, the consequences are momentous 
enough that many consumers study the safety characteristics of the different vehicles they are 
contemplating for purchase. Buyers often consider the protective equipment offered and 
scrutinize the results of crash tests when deciding which model to choose. Such information is 
widely available. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration regularly conducts crash 
tests and rates vehicle models under its New Car Assessment Program. The Insurance Institute 
for Highway Safety also performs such tests and publicizes the results in various ways, including 
on its Web site. Consumer Reports publishes a Safety Assessment rating, which is a combination 
of the NHTSA’s findings and results of handling and braking tests conducted by that magazine’s 
parent organization, Consumers Union.  
 
As important as these studies are, one must accept that they have limited value. After all, no test 
procedure can replicate all of the conditions that come into play when things go wrong on the 
road. To address this rather fundamental shortcoming, we and other investigators have sifted 
through a great deal of real-world data to better reveal how driver and environmental conditions 
influence crashes—and how well safety devices and vehicle design protect occupants when an 
accident happens. The yardstick we and others use for this purpose takes the form of the fatality 
or serious-injury rate for various vehicle types or for specific makes and models. Unfortunately, 
in these kinds of analyses it is difficult, often impossible, to judge the relative contributions of 
driver behavior, environmental conditions and vehicle attributes to the overall fatality or injury 
rate.  
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For our studies, we calculated the risk of driver fatality using the Fatality Analysis Reporting 
System, or FARS, the federal database of all deaths stemming from accidents on public 
roadways. “Fatality risk,” in our formulation, is simply the number of driver deaths divided by 
the number of registered vehicles operating during the year under examination. Actually, our 
procedure is a little more complicated, because we typically analyze a range of several years and 
because we normally do not have registration records for the entire period (the full complement 
of these data being too costly to obtain). So we estimate the total number of registered-vehicle 
years indirectly by making some straightforward deductions from the information contained in 
our limited records (such as the model year of each registered vehicle). Using this approach, we 
can easily calculate fatality risk for a particular type of vehicle or for an individual make or 
model. 
 
Researchers at the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, as well as some others, use this same 
risk metric for many of their studies. We were, however, interested in exploring not only the 
danger to someone operating a particular type or model, but also the risk that such a vehicle 
imposes on other drivers. That is, we were keen to find out the total burden society bears by 
encouraging one sort of motor vehicle over another. Usually investigators only present and 
discuss the risk to occupants of the car or truck in question—as if society at large has no stake in 
the mayhem caused by some vehicles as long as those riding in them aren’t themselves killed. 
 
Because we used actual crash statistics, the values we calculated reflect the risk of involvement 
in a crash and the speed at which it occurs, which hinge primarily on environmental factors and 
the behavior of the driver, as well as the risk of fatality once a serious crash has taken place, 
which depends on belt use, vehicle design and driver frailty. As such, our use of the word “risk” 
here is just shorthand for “risk as a car or truck is really driven.”  
 
One of the most important things we found in our studies is that drivers are just as safe in cars as 
they are in SUVs and pickups (Figure 2). This result is easily explained: Although the risk of 
dying in a collision is often lower in SUVs and pickups, their high center of gravity makes them 
more susceptible to rollovers. Thankfully, the recent trend of manufacturers to produce so-called 
crossover SUVs, which are lower and sometimes wider than conventional truck-based SUVs, has 
led to large reductions in the rollover risk. 
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Figure 2. Driving is, of course, dangerous—but just how dangerous depends a great deal on the type of 
vehicle people choose to do it in.  Large pickup trucks, for example, are more than five times more likely to 
cause a fatality than are imported luxury cars.  And a larger fraction of the fatality risk from such trucks falls 
on the drivers of other vehicles.  But driver behavior is also a factor, one that probably accounts for why 
minivans prove much safer than sports cars.  (Differences in risk of less than 10 percent are not statistically 
significant.) 
 
 
Among cars, large ones present only slightly lower risks than midsize models, compact cars or 
even the safer subcompacts. The small differences are within the statistical uncertainty of the 
analysis. What really surprised us, however, was the wide range in risk among different models 
of subcompact cars—the worst ones having an average fatality risk that is three times that of the 
best ones.  
 
It is not hard to find examples of a small car, a large car and an SUV that all pose about the same 
amount of risk to their drivers. On the other hand, in terms of the risk to drivers of other vehicles, 
SUVs and pickups are much more dangerous than cars or minivans. Common sense explains 
why: Most conventional SUVs are merely carlike cabins bolted onto the frames of pickup trucks, 
which include two longitudinal steel beams that can act like spears or fork tines when striking a 
car, often overriding a bumper in a frontal crash or punching through a door in a side impact 
(Figure 3). These high, rigid structures make the designs of pickup trucks and truck-based SUVs 
fundamentally incompatible with those of cars, which is why researchers in the field of traffic 
safety refer to the “aggressivity” of such designs. 
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Figure 3. Unlike most cars, pickup trucks and truck-based SUVs are built on a frame that contains two 
longitudinal steel rails, which often prove to be very “aggressive” in accidents with other vehicles.  The frame 
shown here is used in Dodge’s Ram 150 pickup truck. 
 
 
These experts have considered various ways to reduce the aggressivity of SUVs and light trucks 
towards cars. Strategies include redesigning truck fronts and bumpers to make them lower or 
“softer”, and raising the door sills of cars to prevent the intrusion of truck bumpers and frame 
rails. Our analysis of car-based crossover SUVs that lack rigid frame rails and have lower fronts 
indicates that these newer designs are much less dangerous than truck-based SUVs (they also 
provide roughly 3- to 4-miles-per-gallon better fuel economy for a given interior volume). 
 
We also found, not surprisingly, that the aggressivity of pickup trucks increases with their rated 
carrying capacity. The largest pickups are nearly six times more aggressive to other vehicles than 
the average car.  Indeed, our study uncovered a shocking statistic: We calculate that during the 
14 years the average one-ton pickup truck is driven, it has almost a 1 percent chance of killing 
someone.  (Only one-third of this huge risk falls on those driving the truck.) 
 
Bad Cars or Bad Drivers? 
 
Our analyses show clearly enough that SUVs and trucks pose considerable dangers, but some of 
our other findings appear to have less to do with size, weight or design, and more to do with who 
tends to drive a particular vehicle and how. To probe these issues, we used information about age 
and gender, as well as various measures of illegal driving (alcohol or drug involvement, driving 
without a valid license or reckless driving in the crash, as well as the operator’s driving record 
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for the previous three years). And although we can only offer some suggestive observations 
rather than concrete conclusions, certain patterns seem clear enough to explain why one vehicle 
so often proves less dangerous than another. 
 
For example, the safest vehicles (for the person sitting behind the steering wheel) are minivans; 
the riskiest are sports cars.  Minivans have the lowest fraction of driver fatalities that are men 
under 26 years old (4 percent); sports cars have the highest (39 percent). So we suspect that 
differences in the behavior of their drivers account in large measure for why these two classes of 
vehicles pose such different risks to the people who operate them. After all, minivans are often 
used to transport children and, as a consequence, their drivers tend to be especially careful, 
whereas the people who zoom around in sports cars are likely to, well, cut corners in that regard. 
We found also that driving imported luxury cars carries extremely low risk, for reasons that are 
not obvious. Such cars typically have the newest safety technologies, so perhaps the presence of 
side-curtain airbags and electronic stability controls contributes here. But curiously, the 
relatively small number of driver fatalities arising from this class of automobile contains a 
sizable fraction of young men (21 percent). Assuming that this number just reflects the 
proportion of imported luxury cars driven by young men, we would conclude that vehicle design 
and safety features offset the risky nature of many of their drivers. 
 
Smaller cars provide further evidence for this phenomenon. On average, the high-risk 
subcompact cars we identified appear to be driven by young men only slightly more frequently 
(23 percent) than are low-risk subcompact cars (21 percent), which suggests that factors other 
than the characteristics and behaviors of their drivers are causing the large difference in fatality 
rates.  We believe that the details of the designs of these cars make them dangerous. 
 
Another thing we learned was that the drivers killed in SUVs and pickups are no different, at 
least in terms of age, gender, and driving history, from those of most cars. Therefore, the 
comparatively high rollover risk and the risk to others we found for SUVs are probably not 
caused by the behavior of their operators. But we hesitate to ascribe the increased risks in 
pickups entirely to their design. Why not? Because pickups tend to be driven on rural roads to a 
greater extent than are cars and SUVs, and such roads are particularly dangerous, for a variety of 
reasons: They are often designed for lower speeds, but speed limits are rarely enforced; 
oncoming traffic is not typically separated by a barrier; shoulders rarely have guardrails, are 
usually narrow and sometimes don’t exist at all; these roads are not as well lit; they are often far 
from trauma centers; and so forth. 
 
To test whether these factors are truly at play, we calculated the population density of the county 
in which each crash took place. As expected, pickup fatalities occur, on average, in much more 
rural areas than do the deaths in cars or SUVs. An analysis we did of traffic-accident data from 
California by county also indicates that, for all vehicle types, fatality risks both to drivers and to 
drivers of other vehicles increase as population density decreases. Therefore, some of the high 
risk to others that we calculate for pickups comes from their traveling much of the time on 
dangerous rural roads, rather than purely from the aggressivity of their design. 
 
To take things one step further, we also calculated risks for individual makes and models (Figure 
4). And here we found some very interesting results. For instance, the lowest risk subcompact 
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car, the VW Jetta, appears often to be driven by the most risk-prone drivers: 32 percent of them 
are young males, many with poor driving histories. Another telling example is the Hyundai 
Elantra. It had side-curtain airbags added for model year 2001, and we see a 30-percent reduction 
in risk to Elantra drivers after its redesign, which coincided with an improvement in its frontal 
crash-test rating, from 3 to 5 stars. Similarly, the Ford Focus has a nearly 40-percent lower risk 
to its drivers than the model it replaced, the Escort. Because the average driver of these models 
likely did not change much in such a short time period, these reductions suggest that vehicle 
design can indeed have a large effect on safety. 
 
Figure 4. Analysis of a federal crash database illuminates the fatality risk associated with particular makes 
and models of cars and trucks—and apportions the overall risk between the driver of the vehicle in question 
(horizontal axis) and the drivers of any other vehicles involved in the crash (vertical axis).  Half- and one-ton 
pickup trucks, which pose considerably higher risk to others than the models shown here, are omitted.  
(Differences of less than 20 percent are not statistically significant.) 
 
 
So how does the fatality risk of car models correlate with their masses? Not as well as one might 
be led to believe. Other attributes, such as vehicle make, correlate more strongly with fatality 
risk. In particular, Japanese and German cars have better safety records than U.S. or Korean cars 
of similar weight (Figure 5). And a car’s resale value after five years of ownership is much more 
strongly correlated with reduced fatality risk than is mass. This observation provides yet more 
evidence that smart (dare we say “intelligent”) design can overcome any disadvantage that lower 
mass may impart in certain types of crashes.  
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Figure 5. Intriguing evidence already exists that safety is not inexorably tied to vehicle weight.  In fact, the 
overall correlation between risk and weight (left) is quite weak, and focus on it misses the stronger 
dependence of risk on the vehicle’s manufacturer: The products of Japanese and German makers (blue) have 
proven to be less risky than those of the U.S. “big three” (General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler, green)—
across a range of weights.  Indeed, the tightest link appears to be with the resale price of the vehicle after five 
years (right), the more expensive vehicles proving the least risky. 
 
 
What Then Must We Do? 
 
For too long the conventional wisdom that lighter cars and trucks are less safe has helped stymie 
efforts to increase the fuel economy of new vehicles and to reduce their greenhouse-gas 
emissions. This is a shame. One reason is that automotive engineers can improve fuel economy 
with no or little reduction in vehicle mass. Another is that with thoughtful design, lighter and 
smaller models can be made just as safe as larger, heavier ones, allowing even greater fuel 
economy. 
 
The NHTSA recently issued rules modestly tightening fuel-economy standards for light-duty 
trucks, increasing the requirement for this category (which includes SUVs and minivans) from 
22.2 miles per gallon to 23.5 miles per gallon by 2010. But the U.S. Court of Appeals overturned 
that measure in November 2007, telling the NHTSA, in essence, to do better. The scheme that 
the judges shot down continued to allow trucks to have lower fuel economy than cars; the 
NHTSA proposal also allowed larger trucks (defined by their “footprint”) to have poorer fuel 
economy than smaller trucks. This size-based standard was preferable to a weight-based one that 
some were proposing, but it was still lacking, for many reasons. 
 
The NHTSA adopted a size-based standard for trucks because regulators are clinging to the myth 
that smaller trucks are intrinsically less safe than larger ones. We and others have shown that this 
belief is unfounded: The center of gravity (in rollovers) and frontal height and stiffness (in 
crashes with objects), not footprint, are the important variables controlling protection of a 
vehicle’s occupants. What’s more, our analysis shows that larger pickups (as measured by their 
rated capacity) impose greater risk on the occupants of other vehicles than do smaller pickups. 
 
So the NHTSA’s size-based standard is not necessary to protect truck drivers. Worse, it 
jeopardizes car drivers. And the size-based standard fails to set any overall requirement for a 
manufacturer’s fleet of light trucks. So by shifting production toward larger models, an 
automaker could in effect relax the fuel-economy requirements under which it operated. Clearly, 
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such toothless measures will not provide the dramatic reductions in carbon dioxide emissions 
needed to combat global warming, nor will they put a dent into the problem of excessive 
dependence on foreign oil. 
 
As the agency responsible for regulating both fuel economy and safety, the NHTSA can and 
should do better. The NHTSA should not try to regulate safety through the backdoor, by 
manipulating fuel-economy standards in such a way as to promote the sale of vehicles that some 
people believe might be less dangerous to their drivers by virtue of their great size and weight. 
Rather, the NHTSA should set fuel-economy standards independently from safety standards. For 
the latter, the nation clearly needs rules that take into account not just the dangers to a vehicle’s 
occupants, but also the risk that a car or truck poses to others on the road. 
 
The 2008 Energy Bill the president recently signed requires that new cars and light trucks have 
an average fuel-economy of 35 miles per gallon by 2020.  Although this legislation does not 
explicitly call for a size-based standard, it still allows separate fuel economy levels for cars and 
trucks.  By continuing to treat cars and light trucks differently, the provisions of the new law, as 
well as current safety standards, encourage consumers to purchase gas-guzzling and aggressive 
pickups and SUVs.  Steps should be taken to apply the same standards equally to all light 
vehicles.   
 
Requiring that all light-duty vehicles meet the same stringent fuel-economy standards would 
increase the manufacturing costs of large pickup trucks and SUVs substantially. But some sticker 
shock here would be beneficial, because it would discourage consumers from purchasing a big 
vehicle unless they really needed one. Those people who truly require a large truck, say to pull a 
trailer or to haul cargo for  a business, could be helped by offering them appropriate tax 
incentives (as are available now for vehicles weighing more than 6,000 pounds). So large pickup 
trucks and enormous SUVs would still be around, but over time they would presumably be found 
in dwindling numbers. 
 
That change alone would improve highway safety for society as a whole. Other gains would 
come from appropriate regulations on vehicle compatibility and aggressivity, tougher roof-crush 
standards and improved seat-belt technology, which together would save far more lives than 
might possibly be put in jeopardy by tightened fuel-economy standards. There’s really no reason 
to think that you can’t save people and the planet at the same time. 
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